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The mass privatization programs of Eastern Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Union have been designed as the centerpieces of the mo-
mentous transformation of the region's command economies to
principles of market forces. The programs are designed to distribute
shares in thousands of state-owned enterprises amongst hundreds of
millions of citizens for free or for nominal payment, thereby creating a
revolutionary class of citizen-shareholders with a strong stake in the
privatization process. From the inception of the first wave of large-
scale privatization in Czechoslovakia, investment funds' have played a
central role in the successes and failures of the varying mass privatiza-
tion programs of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
This article presents the major issues and policy options to be
considered in preparing investment fund legislation for privatizing
economies. The conclusions drawn herein are based upon the experi-
ence of government officials, World Bank representatives and the au-
thor and other attorneys of the law firm of White & Case gained in
connection with the establishment of investment fund legislation in
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Russia, Poland, Armenia, Lithuania
and Kazakhstan.2
1 The term "investment fund" as used in this article generally refers to an enterprise which
is owned by a large number of persons and which is primarily engaged in the business of invest-
ing in securities. Different types of investment funds are referred to in various countries as
investment companies, management companies, investment trusts, unit trusts, open-end funds,
closed-end funds, mutual funds, money market funds, options funds, growth funds, index funds,
or emerging market funds, depending upon the specific features of the fund and the types of
securities in which it invests.
2 This article has been adapted from a report prepared by the author for the Ministry of
Economy of the Republic of Armenia and from his work in connection with White & Case's
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This article focuses on the role and regulatory framework for in-
vestment funds formed in the context of mass privatization programs
to accept privatization vouchers and cash and invest in the shares of
privatized companies. The article is divided into four sections. Part II
discusses the role of investment funds in the voucher privatization
programs of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Russia.
Parts III and IV discuss the main benefits and dangers which invest-
ment funds may present to privatizing economies. Part V presents
recommendations regarding the main objectives of investment fund
legislation and options for achieving such objectives.
II. INVESTMENT FUNDS IN THE VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION
PROGRAMS OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS,
POLAND AND RUSSIA
In the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
investment funds have usually been organized as joint stock compa-
nies3 which issue their shares to citizens in return for the contribution
of money or privatization vouchers.4 It is intended that the invest-
ment funds will invest the money and vouchers received from their
shareholders primarily in the shares of privatized state-owned enter-
prises. The funds may then manage their investments in different
privatized companies by trading their shares to other funds and on the
emerging stock markets, by voting at the general meeting of share-
holders of the companies in which they hold shares, and by appointing
managers and supervisory board members for these companies.
Investment funds have been designed to fill different roles in the
several different types of voucher and mass privatization programs
which have been established in the countries undergoing privatization
preparation of the Regulations on Investment Funds for the Republic of Armenia. Thanks go to
White & Case attorneys John Erickson and Stephen Harder for their input based on their expe-
rience in drafting investment fund regulations for the Republic of Poland, the Russian Federa-
tion, and the Republic of Kazakhstan. Thanks also go to the participants at the March 1994
conference on "Mass Privatization: A First Assessment of the Results" held by the Fifth Plenary
Session of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Advisory
Group on Privatization in Paris from which many of the statistics presented in this article were
derived.
3 A joint stock company is the civil law equivalent of a United States corporation with
limited liability for all shareholders and a multi-tiered management structure usually consisting
of a management board (acting as executive officers), a supervisory board (equivalent to a
United States board of directors), and a general meeting of shareholders.
4 As used herein, the term "privatization voucher" refers to the various types of govern-
ment-issued vouchers, coupons or investment points which citizens receive for free (or for a
nominal fee) and may use to purchase shares of privatized companies or of investment funds
which invest in privatized companies.
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in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Following is a brief
discussion of the differing role of investment funds in the voucher and
mass privatization programs that have been adopted to date in the
Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Russia. These programs
have been the main models for other countries and have generated a
large amount of information and analysis which can prove helpful in
designing appropriate investment fund legislation for other privatizing
countries.
A. The Czech and Slovak Republics
The Czech and Slovak voucher privatization programs were
among the first such programs implemented in the former communist
countries and were accordingly designed without the benefit of prior
experience that other countries have been able to refer to. Despite
this fact, the Czech and Slovak programs are generally agreed to have
been tremendously successful in quickly privatizing a large number of
companies with the participation of more than seventy-five percent of
all qualified citizens.5
Under the Czech and Slovak programs, citizens were issued
voucher points which they could use to purchase shares in state-
owned enterprises privatized through an auction process. The almost
fifteen hundred enterprises subject to voucher privatization were first
transformed into joint stock companies and then a majority of their
shares (61.4% on average) was publicly offered for purchase with
vouchers in a single auction referred to as the "first wave" of voucher
privatization.6 A second auction of additional companies and shares
is expected to be completed by the end of 1994.
Voucher points were issued only for use in buying shares in the
companies being privatized through the auction process. The owner-
ship of voucher points was registered through central computers, and
the voucher points were not freely tradable. Voucher holders could
only transfer their voucher points to an investment fund or use them
to directly buy shares in the privatized companies.7
Investment funds in the first Wave were originally formed as joint
stock companies under permissive interim regulations.8 Investment
5 J. Mladek, Voucher Privatization in Czechia and Slovakia 12 (Feb. 1994) (prepared for the
OECD Group on Privatization, Fifth Plenary Session, "Mass Privatization: A First Assessment
of the Results," Paris, Mar. 2-4, 1994).
6 Id. at 26.
7 See id. at 11-12.
8 Decree No. 383/1991 on the Issuance and Use of Investment Vouchers, as amended by
Decrees No. 67/1992 and 69/1992 (CSFR 1992).
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funds were not created by the government but were left to develop if
justified by market forces. This relieved the government from the
time, effort and expense of establishing and staffing the investment
funds.'
Prior to each auction round, a period was established during
which citizens could transfer their voucher points to investment funds.
The investment funds, because they were privately established, had to
compete for citizens' voucher points by offering them attractive man-
agement strategies.' Investment funds played a central role in the
first wave of voucher privatization. Approximately seventy-two per-
cent of all voucher points were transferred to the more than 400 in-
vestment funds which were created." Investment funds used those
vouchers to become the owners of approximately sixty-three percent
of all shares privatized through the voucher privatization program. 2
B. Poland
The Polish mass privatization program is centered around the
role of special investment funds established by the Polish government,
referred to as "National Investment Funds". The government will es-
tablish ten to twenty National Investment Funds and choose the man-
agers of each fund from a competitive tender open to widely known
investment consulting firms from around the world. Citizens who pay
a nominal fee will receive a type of voucher which they win be able
either. to freely trade or eventually exchange for a package of shares
consisting of one share in each National Investment Fund.
Each National Investment Fund will be formed as a joint stock
company and will be governed by the general rules of the commercial
code and special regulations relating only to investment funds.3 The
manager of a National Investment Fund will be a separate legal entity
and will initially manage the investment fund under the terms of a
form contract drafted by the Ministry of Privatization.' 4 The four
hundred to six hundred Polish state-owned enterprises that will be
privatized under the Mass Privatization Program will be initially trans-
formed into joint stock companies. Their shares will then be assigned
by the government to the various National Investment Funds. Thirty-
9 Mladek, supra note 5, at 16.
10 Mladek, supra note 5, at 16.
11 Mladek, supra note 5, at 21.
12 See Mladek, supra note 5, at 22 (Table No. 5).
13 Law on National Investment Funds and Their Privatization § 2.2 (Pol. 1993).
14 Ministry of Privatization of the Republic of Poland, Mass Privatization Programme: For-
mal Invitation To Tender to Manage a National Investment Fund § 9.2 (Sept. 16, 1993).
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three percent of the shares in each enterprise will be given by the
government to one fund, twenty-seven percent of the shares will be
divided equally between all the remaining funds, between fifteen and
thirty percent of the shares will be distributed for free to workers and
farmers, and ten to twenty-five percent of the shares will be retained
by the state.' 5
The National Investment Funds are expected to take an active
role as shareholders in the companies in which they own thirty-three
percent of the shares, a percentage intended to allow the National In-
vestment Funds to have a significant influence upon the companies
while still requiring the cooperation of other shareholders to make
majority decisions.' 6 To encourage the National Investment Fund
managers to actively govern and restructure the companies in which
their fund holds shares, the managers' compensation is directly related
to the financial performance of their funds.17
It is important to note that only the ten to twenty National In-
vestment Funds established by the government will be entitled to par-
ticipate in the Polish mass privatization program. While privately-
sponsored investment funds exist in Poland, citizens will only be able
to redeem their privatization vouchers for shares in the government-
sponsored National Investment Funds, and only the government-
sponsored funds will receive shares in companies privatized under the
program.'
The Polish mass privatization program may be the most complex
and considered of the several programs adopted in the region to date.
It is important to note, however, that while the development of the
program began in 1991 and was passed into law in April 1993, the
program has not yet been put into force due in part to its complexity
and the political and bureaucratic resistance which it encountered.
C. Russia
The Russian voucher privatization program for large enterprises
is similar in many basic respects to the Czech and Slovak programs.
In the Russian program, designated state-owned enterprises are trans-
formed into joint stock companies, and a portion of their shares is sold
at public auctions for vouchers.
15 Law on National Investment Funds, supra note 13, § 10.
16 See Law on National Investment Funds, supra note 13 at § 4.2; Ministry of Privatization of
the Republic of Poland, supra note 14, § 2-1.
17 See Ministry of Privatization of the Republic of Poland, supra note 14, § 9.3.
18 Law on National Investment, supra note 13, § 37.
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The Russian vouchers were offered to every citizen for a small
fee. The vouchers have a face value of 10,000 rubles and are freely
tradable, unlike the Czech and Slovak voucher points. The tradability
of the Russian vouchers quickly created a large voucher exchange
market and provided an alternative to citizens' investment of their
vouchers directly in investment funds or privatized companies.1 9
As in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the government did not
create investment funds as part of the program but allowed these
funds to be privately created in accordance with model forms and li-
censing requirements. Approximately 650 of these funds have been
formed, and more than thirty million citizens have become sharehold-
ers in these funds through the contribution of nearly fifty million
vouchers, about one-third of the total.20 Investment funds were al-
lowed to receive both vouchers and cash contributions from their
shareholders; in practice, however, it appears that less than five per-
cent of the equity of most funds has been contributed in cash.2 An
investment fund is expected to enter into model contracts with both a
management company to manage the business of the fund and with
another company, referred to as a depositary or custodian, to hold the
shares, vouchers and cash of the fund.22
The Russian voucher privatization program differs significantly
from the Czech and Slovak program in the level of ownership and
control possessed by workers and management in the companies
privatized through the Russian auction process. As a result of the spe-
cial share purchase rights, Russian workers and management were
given or allowed to purchase between sixty and seventy percent of the
company's shares while only fifteen to twenty percent of the shares of
a Russian enterprise were offered for voucher sale to citizens and in-
vestment funds- 3 In contrast, an average of 61.4% of the shares of a
Czech company were publicly offered for sale at the first wave
voucher auction, and only two to three percent of the company's
shares were reserved for workers.24 In Poland, investment funds will
19 Mark St. Giles and Sally Buxton, The Role of Investment Funds in the Russian Privatiza-
tion Programme 3 (Aug. 1993) (internal paper prepared for Ira Liebman of the World Bank).
20 M. Boycko, et al., Mass Privatization in Russia 17 (Mar. 1994) (prepared for the OECD
Group on Privatization, Fifth Plenary Session, "Mass Privatization: A First Assessment of the
Results," Paris, Mar. 2-4, 1994; updated from a paper published by the same authors in The
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1993, 139-92).
21 St. Giles and Buxton, supra note 19, at 15.
22 See Regulations For Specialized Investment Funds, App. 2 to Decree No. 1186, §§ 15, 17
(Russ. 1992).
23 Boycko, supra note 20, at 11, 15.
24 Mladek, supra note 5, at 26.
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receive sixty percent of the shares of the privatized companies while
workers will be allotted only between fifteen and thirty percent of the
shares.' The dominant ownership by workers and management of
Russian companies, and the political strength which it represents, is
expected to significantly limit the role of investment funds in influenc-
ing the operations and restructuring of privatized companies.
The creators of the Russian voucher privatization program were
able to refer to both the Polish and the Czechoslovakian voucher
privatization models when designing their program. As the preceding
discussion indicates, the Polish model was not followed in Russia.
When considering the applicability of these models in other privatiz-
ing economies, it may be helpful to consider the reasons why the Po-
lish model was thought to be inappropriate or impractical in Russia.
First, it was believed that such a complicated program would be too
technologically difficult and time-consuming to implement in Russia.
Second, it was believed that by allowing citizens to choose their in-
vestments freely, the Russian program would be more popular and
that citizens would be more active in its support. Third, Russian en-
terprise managers possess significant political influence in the Russian
parliament and were unwilling to accept a program which would cre-
ate shareholders in their companies as strong as the Polish investment
funds are intended to be. Finally, there was a fear that large state-
sponsored funds owning large stakes in Russian companies would be
subject to political control and become little more than government
ministries acting under a different name.26
III. BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT FUNDs IN PRIVATIZING ECONOMIES
This section examines the primary economic benefits which in-
vestment funds can bring to privatizing economies. The extent to
which each of these benefits may be realized depends largely upon the
type of privatization program in which the investment funds operate
and the particular provisions of a country's investment fund regula-
tions, discussed in Part V below.
A. Corporate Governance
Privatization theory is based on the assumption that companies
will perform more efficiently when they are controlled by private own-
25 Law on National Investment Funds, supra note 13, § 10.
26 Boycko, supra note 20, at 4.
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ers than when they are controlled by governmental bodies.27 In order
to cause a company to act efficiently, however, private owners need to
own a sufficiently large share of the company to exercise influence or
control. This may be particularly true in economies in which dramatic
restructuring changes are required, such as replacement of company
management, dismissal of large numbers of workers, discontinuance
of production lines, and the undertaking of new investments.
In the context of a mass privatization program, in which company
shares are sold or exchanged for vouchers held by all citizens, the dan-
ger exists that company shares will be owned by an extremely large
number of small shareholders and that none of these shareholders will
own enough shares to exercise significant influence over a company
and its management. In such situations, the expected efficiency bene-
fits from privatization are unlikely to be realized since company man-
agers will be able to operate without significant accountability or
supervision.
Investment funds present a solution to this problem by gathering
widely dispersed resources (vouchers and cash), using those resources
to purchase significant blocks of shares in privatized companies, and
exercising the rights associated with these shares to monitor and su-
pervise company management. By acting as a significant shareholder
in a company and exercising the rights of control associated with those
shares, investment funds should provide the "corporate governance"
necessary to enact the economic reforms which the privatization pro-
cess is designed to bring about.28
B. Risk Diversification
By investing their vouchers or money in an investment fund
rather than a single operating company, citizens may reduce the risk
of their investment. By investing in an investment fund, a citizen be-
comes an indirect owner of shares in the many companies in which the
investment fund has invested.2 9 Alternatively, the direct investment
27 See STEvE HANKE, PRIVATIZATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND IMPLEMENTATION 53
(1986).
28 The problem of effective corporate governance in the mass privatization context is not
entirely resolved by the interface of investment funds: the funds themselves are corporate enti-
ties owned by a widely dispersed class of small shareholders and may thus have similar deficien-
cies in their own corporate governance. However, the shift of the corporate governance
problem to the investment fund level allows the issue to be addressed within one industry in a
focused manner by the type of regulatory measures discussed infra at Part V.A.
29 In the Czech Republic, for example, investment funds own shares in as many as two hun-
dred different companies. R. E. Anderson, Voucher Funds in Transition Economies: The Czech
and Slovak Examples 4 (Feb. 25, 1994 draft).
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of the same amount would usually make that citizen an owner of the
shares of only one or two privatized companies. This is especially true
for citizens investing only small amounts of voucher points or cash.
Ownership of shares in an investment fund which owns shares in many
different companies reduces a citizen's investment risk because it is
much more likely that an individual company in a particular industry
may fail than that an investment fund may fail, as its success is based
upon the performance of many companies in different industries. In
effect, this type of risk diversification is imposed on citizens in the
Polish mass privatization program as a result of the fact that the Polish
vouchers may only be exchanged for shares in the investment funds
and may not be directly invested in privatized enterprises."0
C. Financial Sophistication/Portfolio Selection
Investment funds in privatizing economies also provide benefits
to citizens and the economy through their management's business and
financial expertise. Properly qualified and licensed investment fund
managers should be better able to choose which companies to invest
in than individual citizens who do not have the same financial training
and knowledge of the market. In addition, investment funds can bet-
ter afford the high cost of gathering and analyzing information about
the performance of different companies. Investment funds which are
managed by banks, as is frequently the case in the Czech Republic,
may have especially reliable knowledge of the value and prospects of
companies on the market as a result of their prior relations with such
companies.3 1 As a result of management's expertise, the investment
funds should make better investments than individual citizens, and the
share market should be more stable and efficient.
D. Access to Financial Resources
It is expected that investment funds in some developing econo-
mies will also be able to assist the companies in which they invest in
obtaining financing as a result of the investment fund managers' con-
tacts with financial institutions and large investors. In Poland, for ex-
ample, investment fund managers will be chosen from among the most
prominent investment consulting firms in the world and are expected
to use their international contacts and experience to assist the compa-
nies in finding necessary resources for restructuring.3 2
30 Law on National Investment Funds, supra note 13, § 37.
31 See Mladek, supra note 5, at 22-23; Anderson, supra note 29, at 5.
32 See Ministry of Privatization of the Republic of Poland, supra note 14, § 2.
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E. Foundations of Securities Market
The involvement of investment funds in voucher privatization
programs has also helped to increase the public's general interest in
vouchers and establish organized markets for vouchers and for the
shares of privatized companies. In the Czech Republic, for example,
citizens did not register for their voucher booklets in large numbers
until investment funds emerged offering guaranteed returns. The
Czech investment funds were then motivated to play central roles in
the establishment of the two organized stock exchanges in the Czech
Republic in order to facilitate their trading of securities.33 In Russia,
where vouchers are bearer documents which are freely tradable, in-
vestment funds have also acted as major traders on the voucher ex-
changes which have been quickly established.34 In addition, through
their role as an intermediary in choosing shares and attracting vouch-
ers and cash, investment funds also simplify the process through which
citizens invest in the new securities market.
IV. RISKS POSED BY INVESTMENT FUNDS
As indicated earlier, investment funds may play important and
central roles in economies undergoing transformation and privatiza-
tion. However, investment funds also occupy a very sensitive position
in transforming economies, particularly because of the large number
of privatization vouchers that they can be expected to accumulate.
(Investment funds hold approximately seventy-two percent of all
vouchers in the Czech and Slovak Republics35 and thirty-three percent
of all vouchers issued in Russia.36) Abuse of this position of trust may
threaten society's faith in the privatization program, the new securities
market and the government itself.37 Following is a brief description of
several of the main risks which may be posed by investment funds if
they are not appropriately regulated.
33 D. Triska, Post-Privatization Securities Markets in the Czech Republic 9 (Mar. 1994 draft)
(prepared for the OECD Group on Privatization, Fifth Plenary Session, "Mass Privatization: A
First Assessment of the Results," Paris, Mar. 2-4, 1994).
34 St. Giles and Buxton, supra note 19, at 16.
35 Triska, supra note 33, at 9.
36 Boycko, supra note 20, at 17.
37 See Russians No Longer Believe in Reforms Following MMM Scandal, TASS, Sept. 1,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Russians Affected by Fraud Close Ranks, TASS, June
23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Russian Pyramid Victims Hit Government, UPI,
Aug. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
The Engines of Privatization
15:75 (1994)
A. Embezzlement, Fraud and Insider Trading
One of the most immediate dangers connected with investment
funds is that the funds may be founded or operated by dishonest indi-
viduals who will either steal directly from the investment fund or use
their positions in the investment fund to profit unfairly. The most se-
rious cases to date have taken the form of pyramid or "ponzi"
schemes wherein enormous sums have been collected through
promises of fantastic returns. In such schemes, a few lucky initial in-
vestors receive payoffs from a portion of the capital contributed by
subsequent investors while remaining funds are siphoned away.38
Problems of this type have arisen repeatedly in Russia in the last year,
as millions of dollars' worth of privatization vouchers have unaccount-
ably disappeared along with the arrest or disappearance of the indi-
viduals entrusted with their safekeeping and management. 39 A
longer-range danger also exists that managers of an investment fund
will manipulate the fund's activities or use their confidential knowl-
edge of the affairs of the fund and of its portfolio companies to engage
in insider trading for their own profit.
B. Ineffective Management
A second danger that investment funds present is that their man-
agers may not be sufficiently active in promoting the interest of the
fund's shareholders but may instead be satisfied to simply receive
their management fee for little effort. As discussed in Part III.A.
above, a problem in corporate governance exists where a company is
owned by many small shareholders and none of these shareholders
has a large enough number of shares to control or influence the man-
agement of the company. Investment funds may reduce the problem
of corporate governance in the companies in which they own a signifi-
cant block of shares, but a similar problem of corporate governance
38 See Russian Central Bank Urges Control on Pyramid Funds, Reuters, Aug. 30, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library; George Rodrigue, World's Biggest Pyramid Swindle Shakes Up
Russia's New Capitalists, MoNTREAL GAZEttE, Aug. 6, 1994, at B3.
39 The most notorious Russian scandals of alleged investment fund fraud and embezzlement
have involved the MMM, Neftalmazinvest (Oil and Diamonds), Tibet, and Russki Dom Selenga
(Russian House of Selling) investment funds, each of which had millions of shareholders; See
Russian Investment Fund Closes, UPI, Aug. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File; Malpractice Revealed by Audit of Neftalmazinvest Voucher Fund, BBC, June 17, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Chrystia Freeland, Russian Court Suspends Fund, FINANCIAL
TiMas, Aug. 18, 1994, at 2. The problem, however, has not been confined only to Russia. See
Moldavia Forms Commission to Battle Local MMM, TASS, Aug. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library.
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may arise within the fund itself as a result of the fund's widely dis-
persed share ownership.
C. Monopolization
A third problem may arise where one or more investment funds
may effectively control several companies in the same industry or
market and influence the companies to cooperate in setting prices in-
stead of competing. An additional monopoly danger may arise when
one or several related investment funds control a large percentage of
the voucher or share market and manipulate market forces through
their dominant position, though such a danger may also be posed by
other large investment groups.
D. High-Risk and Unwise Investments
Danger also exists that investment fund managers may engage in
high-risk or unwise investment strategies that could cause the fund to
fail. Such a situation not only affects the fund's shareholders but may
also have a destabilizing effect upon the securities markets and the
privatization program.
V. GOALS AND OPTIONS FOR INVESTMENT FUND LEGISLATION
The many provisions of investment fund legislation may be or-
ganized around the following basic goals:
(a) promote the efficient operation of investment funds;
(b) prevent investment fund managers and founders from acting
dishonestly;
(c) ensure that investment funds serve legislative objectives and act
conservatively;
(d) prevent the investment fund from exercising monopolistic or domi-
neering powers in the economy; and
(e) ensure that the legislation creates a complete and consistent frame-
work for the establishment and operation of investment funds.
Following is a discussion of the principal types of regulatory pro-
visions which may be enacted to achieve these goals. Where an issue
has been addressed differently in several countries, recommendations
are outlined regarding which of these approaches may prove best in
privatizing countries.
A. Promote Efficiency of Investment Funds
The efficiency and motivation of the managers of the investment
fund may be promoted by the following types of regulations.
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1. Restrict the Legal Form of Investment Funds
Strict control of the legal form under which investment funds may
be organized is a linchpin to the entire investment fund regulatory
structure. Requiring investment funds to be organized in a well-estab-
lished legal form enhances the force of the regulations by appropriat-
ing the practice and grounding already established for such form and
removing an element of uncertainty and potential manipulation from
the hands of those seeking to avoid application of the regulations.40
Investment funds are typically established as one of two different
types of enterprises. Investment funds in most developing economies
have been formed as joint stock companies. This has been the case for
the great majority of investment funds formed in Russia, the Czech
and Slovak Republics, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Poland. These in-
vestment funds operate under the same general rules which apply to
other joint stock companies and are governed by a shareholders'
meeting, supervisory board and management committee.
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, however, investment funds
may also be established as a form of joint property without separate
legal personality.4' Such property is managed by an investment man-
ager under a contract. Such an investment fund is commonly referred
to as a "unit trust," and the persons contributing to the fund are called
"participants." These participants possess no voting rights and have
no direct control over the managers of the property. Investment
funds were presumably allowed to be formed as unit trusts in the
Czech Republic because the relatively few regulations governing the
operation of a unit trust make it easier to issue and redeem shares
than in a standard joint stock company.
The poor control held by participants in a unit trust makes it pref-
erable to prohibit such types of investment funds and forego their
need by modifying the regulations governing the issuance and re-
demption of the shares of investment funds formed as joint stock
companies.
2. Closed-End vs. Open-End Investment Funds
Both joint stock companies and unit trusts may be formed as
"closed-end" investment funds or "open-end" investment funds. A
closed-end fund is a fund in which a shareholder may not redeem his
40 See MMM and RDS Must Meet Obligations to Shareholders, TASS, Aug. 24, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library (investment fund claims non-applicability of investment fund regu-
lations because of technical variance in its legal form).
41 See Act on Investment Companies and Investment Funds, §§ 9-14 (1992) (CSFR).
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shares and can leave the fund only by selling his shares to another
person. An open-end investment fund is a fund in which a share-
holder may redeem his shares and require the company to pay him
back an amount in cash equal to the book value of his share of the
investment fund. Managers are thought to be more responsive to the
interests of the shareholders of an open-end fund, since shareholders
can directly and dramatically indicate their displeasure with the man-
agement of an open-end fund by redeeming their shares, thereby re-
ducing the size of the fund.42 To redeem these shares, however, the
investment fund must keep a sufficient amount of its assets in very
liquid form to be able to pay shareholders when required. The share
markets in most of the countries presently undergoing transformation
from communist economic systems are unlikely in the near future to
be sufficiently liquid for open-end investment funds to be able to op-
erate without keeping a significant amount of their capital in cash,
which would largely defeat the purpose of having investment funds
play a role in the privatization process.
In light of the above, investment funds should be required to be
initially formed as closed-end joint stock companies. When the share
market becomes liquid enough to also allow open-end joint stock
companies to operate and meet their redemption obligations, closed-
end funds may be allowed to be transformed into open-end funds
upon the resolution of their shareholders and permission from govern-
ment authorities. Though this approach may delay the formation of
open-end joint stock companies beyond the time in which they might
develop naturally if left purely to market forces, such a delay should
be more than balanced by the reduction in the number of investment
funds that may fail to meet their redemption obligations and the effect
that such failures may have on the developing securities markets.
3. Model By-Laws and Special Shareholder Powers
Special provisions may be required to enhance the protection of
shareholders' interest and to strengthen the powers of shareholders in
the fund because the ownership of an investment fund is likely to be
so widely dispersed among citizens. This has typically been done by
requiring the funds to be formed in accordance with model by-laws set
forth in the investment fund legislation.43 The model by-laws
42 See Anderson, supra note 29, at 29-30.
43 The Polish, Russian and Kazakh investment fund legislation require all investment funds
to conform their charters to model charters appended to the main legislation. In contrast, the
Czechoslovakian legislation only requires funds to include several basic categories of informa-
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strengthen the shareholders' control by typically requiring a resolu-
tion of the fund's general meeting of shareholders for the following
actions:
a. amending the fund's by-laws;
b. establishing or amending investment directions stating the main
types of securities in which the fund will invest;
c. executing or amending contracts to hold the securities, cash and
other assets of the fund and establishing the level of fees paid under such
contracts;
d. executing or amending contracts to manage the fund and establish-
ing the level of fees paid under such contracts;
e. accepting the annual report of the fund's management;
f. deciding to distribute dividends from the profit of the fund;
g. appointing the officers, supervisory board members and auditors of
the fund; and
h. liquidating the fund.
The powers of the shareholders in an investment fund may also
be strengthened by making it easier for shareholders to exercise their
power through certain procedural provisions included in the model
by-laws. Such provisions may, for example, lower the percentage of
shares necessary to call an extraordinary meeting of shareholders or
relax the general rules for obtaining proxy rights to vote on behalf of
shareholders who cannot attend shareholder meetings.
4. Disclosure of Information
Regulations can promote the efficient operation of an investment
fund by requiring the fund to fully disclose the details of its activities
to its shareholders, thereby allowing them to exercise their voting and
sale rights in a knowledgeable way. In Russia, for example, detailed
audited financial statements of each investment fund must be pub-
lished every quarter in the newspapers.' In addition, shareholders
may review all agreements entered into by the fund as well as infor-
mation about the members of the fund's corporate bodies and the em-
ployees and directors of the companies which manage the fund and
hold its securities.45 In addition to allowing examination of managers'
efficiency, record keeping and disclosure requirements can also serve
as important tools for the detection of fraud.46
tion in their charters and does not otherwise dictate form or content. Act on Investment Com-
panies and Investment Funds, supra note 41, § 16.
44 Regulations on Investment Funds, App. 1 to Decree No. 1186, § 16 (Russ. 1992).
45 Id. § 38.
46 See Regional MMM Office Manages Affairs Without any Documents, TASS, Aug. 19,1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Russian Government Prepares Anti-Fraud Package, TASS,
Aug. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
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5. Management Contracts
The vast majority of investment funds established to date in East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union have adopted the approach
frequently followed in the United States and Western Europe
whereby the investment fund is managed by a separate company act-
ing under contract.47
There are several advantages to this approach. First, the organ-
ized financial expertise of the management companies may give the
fund access to better services than can be provided by officers whom
the fund locates and hires on an individual basis. Second, this ap-
proach establishes an additional level of monitoring within the fund
since the fund's executive officers will be responsible for monitoring
the outside management company. Third, these contracts may place
the burden of all administrative costs upon the manager, thereby insu-
lating the fund from unexpected costs which may erode the fund's
capital.
Most investment fund legislation requires management contracts
to be approved by the fund's general meeting of shareholders but does
not require governmental approval of the contracts. The Polish, Rus-
sian and Kazakh laws, however, require management contracts to fol-
low a standard form set out in the investment fund regulations.
Requiring government approval or specific forms for management
contracts is criticized by some analysts on the grounds that govern-
ment bodies are frequently not well-suited to determine the best
terms of such a commercial agreement and that such requirements
may prevent contractual forms from developing which may be more
favorable to the investment fund.48
In light of the possible imbalance of sophistication between the
management company and the fund officers or collusion between
these parties, management contracts should be required to follow a
standard form to protect fund shareholders and clearly establish the
terms of the fund's relationship with its managers.
47 Countries allowing or requiring investment funds to be managed by outside firms include
Russia, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Armenia. An ex-
ception is Romania's unique Private Ownership Funds system in which investment funds are
operated directly by government-appointed boards of directors. See Commercial Companies
Privatization Law No. 58/1991 (Rom. 1991); National Agency for Privatization, Overview of the
Privatization Law (Rom. 1991).
48 See Anderson, supra note 29, at 33.
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6. Success Fees
A management contract may seek to promote the efficient opera-
tion of a fund by basing the manager's fee upon the success of the
fund. In the Polish mass privatization program, for example, invest-
ment fund managers are partially paid with shares in the investment
fund which they manage, and the ultimate size of their fee depends
upon the performance of the fund.49 Managers may be further moti-
vated to promote the long-term health of the fund by regulations
which prevent the managers from selling such shares for a certain pe-
riod of time.50 Some analysts fear, however, that mandatory formulas
for fees may not be as efficient as arrangements that will arise in the
market and that a success-based formula may motivate fund managers
to engage in high-risk investments or otherwise act in unexpected
ways which could be detrimental to the economy.51 These analysts
prefer the approach taken in other countries such as Russia and the
Czech and Slovak Republics which may less directly motivate fund
managers by allowing them to receive fixed fees which can be no
larger than a certain percentage of the fund's total asset value.
A possible compromise between these concerns would allow fund
managers to receive a basic cash fee sufficient to cover their opera-
tional costs and then receive the remainder of their fee in the form of
shares in the fund which they will be restricted from transferring for a
specified period of time.
B. Prevent Dishonesty and Fraud
The following types of regulations are intended to reduce the risk
that investment fund managers or founders will act dishonestly or
profit unfairly from their positions with the fund.
1. Licensing Requirements
Nearly all investment fund legislation requires an individual or
legal entity to obtain a special license from a governmental body
before it will be allowed to create or manage an investment fund. De-
lay in enacting and enforcing licensing regulations has been one of the
factors which has allowed scandals involving such funds as Russki
Dom Selenga to reach huge proportions affecting millions of share-
49 Ministry of Privatization of the Republic of Poland, supra note 14, § 9.3-3.
50 Ministry of Privatization of the Republic of Poland, supra note 14, § 9.3-5.
51 See Anderson, supra note 29, at 24.
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holders. 2 While some countries have stricter licensing requirements
than others, a basic requirement to obtain a license in any country is
proof that the manager or founder and the fund's employees have not
been previously convicted of economic crimes.53
2. Depositary Agreements and Auditors
The Russian, Kazakh, Czech and Slovak investment fund regula-
tions also attempt to prevent the embezzlement and misappropriation
of investment fund assets by requiring that the shares, cash and vouch-
ers of an investment fund be held by a separate company called a
depositary or custodian. A depositary is responsible under a contract
for safeguarding these securities and recording and executing all trans-
actions involving the fund's securities. The depositary is often also
responsible for monitoring the activities of the investment fund man-
agers and ensuring that transactions are carried out in accordance
with the fund's investment declaration. In addition, most legislation
requires that the accounts and activities of investment funds be au-
dited annually, semi-annually or quarterly by certified auditing com-
panies to ensure the propriety of all transactions.
In Russia, there have been some difficulties encountered to date
in the implementation of the depositary system. Russian banks have
thus far been hesitant to act as depositaries for investment funds.54 As
a result, the funds and management companies have had to create af-
filiate companies to perform these depositary functions, which obvi-
ously reduces many of the safeguards which the depositary system is
designed to achieve. In addition, while a depositary agreement must
follow a specific model frequently set forth in the investment fund
regulations, the Russian legislation does not require a company to ob-
tain any license or government approval to act as a depositary. This
fact may have contributed to one of the recent investment fund scan-
dals in Russia where fourteen million dollars worth of vouchers appar-
ently disappeared from a fund; the managers claimed that the
52 See Chrystia Freeland, Russian Court Suspends Fund, FINANCIAL TIMEs, Aug. 18, 1994, at
2; David Hearst, MMM Boss Puts Case From Jail, GUARDIAN, Sept. 12, 1994, at 8 ("By insisting
all investment funds had to be licensed, the president provided the funds with an excuse to stop
trading, reneging on their promise to redeem all shares issued, and allowing them to keep the
money.")
53 See, e.g., Regulations on Investment Funds, supra note 44, § 18.
54 St. Giles and Buxton, supra note 19, at 10.
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vouchers had been handed over to a foreign company to hold as the
fund's depositary.55
In light of the experience in Russia, it may be advisable to allow
depositary fees to be sufficiently large to encourage responsible insti-
tutions to act as depositaries while requiring all depositaries to be li-
censed or to file a guarantee or bond insuring the performance of
their duties. The practicality of this approach may depend upon the
existence of a sufficient number of institutions which may be willing to
provide such services and the extent of resources and manpower
which the government can devote to licensing and monitoring these
institutions.
3. Limits on Manager Compensation
Most investment fund laws adopted in the region place a limit on
the fees which may be paid to investment fund managers to avoid situ-
ations where the management has taken effective control of the fund
away from the fund's shareholders and seeks to pay itself excessive
fees at the fund's expense.56 It may also be advisable to require the
fund managers to be responsible for all costs arising in the administra-
tion of the investment funds and to prohibit them from receiving pay-
ment beyond their fee in compensation for such costs. Otherwise, the
fund may be exposed to escalating fees, and the manager may divert
monies from the fund in the form of claimed costs which may be diffi-
cult for shareholders to monitor.57
4. Minimize Potential Conflicts of Interest
An important role of investment fund legislation is to prevent
conflicts of interest which may cause managers, depositaries or audi-
tors to act against the interest of the fund. Investment fund regula-
tions frequently prohibit company managers, workers' groups and
certain state bodies from founding or managing investment funds in
order to avoid situations where these groups may manage the funds to
promote their own political or financial interests rather than those of
55 See Voucher Fund Accused of Mass Fraud, Moscow TimEs, Mar. 26,1994, (concerning the
collapse of the Neftalmazinvest investment fund).
56 See Regulations for Specialized Investment Funds, supra note 22, § 34 (limiting annual
management fees of a voucher investment fund to no more than ten percent of the average net
asset value of the fund); Act on Investment Companies and Investment Funds, supra note 41,
§ 27 (limiting annual management fees to no more than two percent of a fund's net asset value or
twenty percent of its profit).
57 This approach has been incorporated in the Armenian investment fund regulations. See
Regulations on Investment Funds, App. B § 5 (Arm. 1994).
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the fund.5" Affiliates of an investment fund's management company
and depositary are usually restricted from constituting the majority of
the supervisory board members of the investment fund.59 In addition,
investment funds are frequently required to obtain supervisory board
approval prior to investing in or entering into agreements with any
entities in which the managers, depositaries or auditors have an
interest.60
5. Full Disclosure
As the full disclosure of information regarding the activities of
the investment fund and its managers may encourage the efficiency of
the fund's operations, disclosure is also expected to be a major tool in
preventing fraud and theft from the fund. In addition to the publica-
tion of audited financial statements, regulations should also require
the disclosure of all prices paid and received for shares held by the
fund and the disclosure of any ownership connections or agreements
between the management company, the fund and the companies in
which the fund owns shares.
C. Promote Legislative Objectives and Minimize the Chance of
Failure of the Fund
Drafters of investment fund legislation in privatizing countries
have proposed the following types of provisions to ensure that invest-
ment funds serve their intended purpose and to minimize the chance
of the funds' financial failure:
1. Restrict Types of Investments and Activities
Investment fund regulations commonly impose the following
types of restrictions on the investment and activities of investment
funds:
(a) funds may invest only in securities;
(b) funds may not invest in the shares of any enterprise with unlimited
liability;
(c) funds may not invest in bonds other than government bonds or
bonds traded on licensed exchanges;
(d) funds may not invest in precious metals, commodities, options or
futures contracts; and
(e) funds may not speculate by agreeing to sell shares they do not yet
Own.
58 See, eg., Regulations For Specialized Investment Funds, supra note 22, §§ 8, 12.
59 See, eg., Regulations For Specialized Investment Funds, supra note 22, § 31.
60 See, eg., Regulations For Specialized Investment Funds, supra note 22, § 33.
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The Polish investment fund legislation restricts investment funds
from investing more than five percent of their assets in real estate or
in companies engaged primarily in real estate investment.6' The Rus-
sian and Kazakh investment fund legislation prohibit any investment
in real estate by requiring that all investments be made in securities.62
The Czechoslovakian regulations, however, place no limitation on the
percentage of a fund's assets that can be invested in real estate.63 As
an investor in real estate, an investment fund does not fulfill its de-
sired purpose of providing corporate governance and access to financ-
ing for privatized companies. In addition, real estate investments are
often viewed as inherently volatile and are difficult to accurately
value, a problem that complicates the already difficult issue of assess-
ing the value of an investment fund's assets.
The Russian and Kazakh investment fund laws also prohibit in-
vestment funds from taking loans or issuing bonds, guarantees or
other agreements which entitle another party to a first right to the
fund's assets. 64 Such a restriction can prevent fund managers from
risking the failure of the fund by making commitments which the fund
may not be able to satisfy.
Investment fund legislation adopted in the Czech and Slovak Re-
publics also prohibits investment funds from investing in securities
which are not traded or deemed acceptable for trading on a licensed
stock exchange.65 This type of restriction, however, was not imposed
in Russia because of the undeveloped stage of their stock exchanges
and does not seem practical to impose in many of the transforming
countries.
2. Limit Percentage of Fund Assets Invested in One Company
Investment fund legislation usually attempts to ensure that in-
vestment funds will have diversified portfolios by prohibiting invest-
ment funds from investing more than a small percentage of their total
assets in the shares of any one company. In Russia and Kazakhstan,
for example, an investment fund cannot invest more than five percent
61 Law on National Investment Funds, supra note 13, § 44.8.
62 Regulations For Specialized Investment Funds, supra note 22, § 25; Statute of Investment
Privatization Funds, Supp. to Decree No. 1290, § 26 (Kaz. 1993).
63 The Czechoslovakian Act imposes a five percent limit on investments in any one piece of
real property but imposes no limit on aggregate real estate investments. See Act on Investment
Companies and Investment Funds, supra note 41, §§ 18, 24(2)(b).
64 Regulations For Specialized Investment Funds, supra note 22, § 25; Statute of Investment
Privatization Funds, supra note 62, § 26.
65 Act on Investment Companies and Investment Funds, supra note 41, § 17.
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of its assets in the shares of one company and must thus spread its
assets over at least twenty different investments.66
3. Restrict Forms of Advertisement and Guarantees
Investment funds may also attempt to engage in high-risk invest-
ment strategies to fulfill promises and guarantees of high returns
made in advertisements soliciting contributions to the fund. Such
promises have unrealistically raised the expectations of shareholders
and have lead to widespread dissatisfaction and political difficulties
when not fulfilled.67
Investment fund advertising and guarantees, however, have been
both blessings and curses to the region's mass privatization programs.
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, the aggressive advertising cam-
paign and promised returns of investment funds are widely credited as
the main factors leading to the high level of public participation in the
program.68 In Russia, the "pie in the sky" television ads of investment
funds, promising annual returns of up to three thousand percent, have
been at the center of the mass privatization program's biggest
scandals.69
Most investment fund laws, including the Russian regulations,
have tried to specifically prohibit the types of guarantees made by the
Russian funds and have attempted to restrict the type of statements
that investment funds can make in their advertisements. 70 In Russia,
however, such regulations have been difficult to enforce. The ineffec-
tiveness of the Russian authorities in controlling investment fund ad-
vertising was dramatically demonstrated when the highly controversial
advertisements for the MMM investment fund continued even after
the fund's founder had been jailed, the fund ordered closed and the
ads ordered stopped, apparently because the Russian television sta-
66 Regulations For Specialized Investment Funds, supra note 22. § 25; Statute of Investment
Privatization Funds, supra note 62, § 26. Czechoslovakian legislation limits investments in one
issue to no more than ten percent of the net asset value of the fund. Act on Investment Compa-
nies and Investment Funds, supra note 41, § 24.
67 See Company Owner Threatens Authorities With Investors' Revenge, AP, July 23, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
68 See, e.g., Ira Liebman, et al., Mass Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union: A Comparative Analysis 31 (Jan. 17, 1994 draft) (prepared for the OECD
Group on Privatization, Fifth Plenary Session, "Mass Privatization: A First Assessment of the
Results," Paris, Mar. 2-4, 1994).
69 See Marcus Warren, Yeltsin Set to Crack Down on Television Temptation, Daily Telegraph,
June 13, 1994, at 9; Russian Watchdog Acts Against TV Investment Ads, Reuters, July 9, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
70 See, e.g., Regulations on Investment Funds, supra note 44, § 40.
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tions found it preferable to defy the authorities' injunction than to risk
returning the advance payments received for the ads' placement.7' In
response to such examples, Armenian investment fund regulations re-
quire all investment fund advertising to be pre-approved by the au-
thorities and subject both advertisers and the media to liability for
contravening this requirement.72
4. Investment Declarations and Disclosure
By requiring investment funds to operate in accordance with the
investment declarations which the shareholders have approved and to
disclose to its investors the investments and trades made by the fund,
regulations do not necessarily prevent funds from following high-risk
strategies but at least allow shareholders to monitor fund activities to
ensure that the investment strategy which the managers have pursued
reflects the shareholders' wishes.
D. Prevent Monopolistic and Anti-Competitive Behavior of
Investment Funds
Three types of provisions are usually included in investment fund
legislation to prevent investment funds from using their powerful posi-
tions in an anti-competitive manner or in other ways harmful to the
economy:
1. Limitation on Percentage of Total Vouchers Owned by an
Investment Fund
Investment funds are frequently restricted from receiving more
than five to ten percent of all vouchers issued in a voucher privatiza-
tion program to ensure that one investment fund does not control
such a large percentage of vouchers that it can control or manipulate
the trading of vouchers, the voucher privatization auctions or the se-
curities market.7 Such a restriction also tends to ensure that citizens
will have a choice of several competing funds in which to invest their
vouchers.
The experience in the Czech and Slovak Republics, where related
groups frequently formed and managed more than one investment
71 See Steve Gutterman, Russian Ads Take Hit in Russian Fund Collapse, ADVERTISING
AoE, Aug. 8, 1994, at 39.
72 See Regulations on Investment Funds, supra note 44, § 16.
73 Regulations For Specialized Investment Funds, supra note 22, § 25 (five percent); Act on
Investment Companies and Investment Funds, supra note 41, § 24 (ten percent); Statute of In-
vestment Privatization Funds, supra note 62, § 26 (five percent).
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fund, indicates that it may be advisable to restrict not only the per-
centage of vouchers which may be owned by an individual investment
fund but also the total percentage which may be owned by a group of
related investment funds.74 Alternatively, regulations may prohibit an
enterprise and its affiliates from forming more than one investment
fund. The potential for investment fund groups to control significant
portions of the voucher market is shown by the fact that although
more than four hundred investment funds have been formed in the
Czech and Slovak Republics, the thirteen largest funds and their affili-
ates control seventy-seven percent of all voucher points given to the
investment funds (which represents fifty-five percent of all voucher
points distributed in the entire first wave of the program).75
2. Limitation on the Percentage of a Company's Shares Which One
Investment Fund May Own
The most frequently debated point included in investment fund
legislation is the limitation placed on the percentage of shares which
an investment fund and its affiliates may own in a company. These
limitations are apparently intended to prevent an investment fund
from becoming a dominant shareholder in a company, thereby causing
the company to take actions which benefit that fund but harm the
company and its other shareholders. For example, a majority share-
holder with cash flow problems may cause a company to liquidate a
significant portion of its assets and pay out liquidation dividends even
though such an action may be harmful to the health of the company
and interests of other shareholders. To address such concerns, invest-
ment fund regulations have imposed the following widely ranging lim-
itations on the percentage of shares which an investment fund may






The problem raised by such limits, however, is that the smaller
the percentage of shares which an investment fund owns in a com-
pany, the less ability the investment fund has to exercise its important
role in the corporate governance of the company. As discussed in
74 Several Czech investment groups established more than ten funds each. Mladek, supra
note 5, at 22.
75 Mladek, supra note 5, at 22.
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Part II.A., supra, this role is seen by many to be central to the success
of a voucher privatization program. In addition, an investment fund
which has only a small percentage of shares in a company may have
little motivation to try to assist that company.
It is significant to note that in Russia the ownership limit was
originally set at ten percent as a result of the strong political influence
of the managers of state-owned enterprises (who were opposed to cor-
porate governance which could interfere with the managers' control of
"their" companies) and a general reluctance to let unknown financial
institutions such as investment funds play such a strong role in the
governance of industrial companies.76 The limit was increased to
twenty-five percent in the 1994 Privatization Program, however, after
it had apparently become clear that investment funds were needed to
create some form of corporate governance in the privatized compa-
nies and prevent company managers from operating without supervi-
sion or accountability. 77
The experience in the Czech and Slovak Republics has indicated
that investment funds may play an active role in corporate governance
when subject to twenty percent ownership limits. When the first wave
of voucher auctions had been completed, it appeared that three or
four funds together owned a majority of shares in many companies
and therefore had the responsibility of appointing members to serve
on the companies' supervisory and management boards.78 Though it
is still too soon to know the results of the funds' exercise of their pow-
ers as large shareholders, evidence is beginning to appear that the
funds are cooperating to actively encourage and monitor the manag-
ers of the companies in which they own shares and are causing these
mangers to be replaced if they prove to be corrupt or incompetent.79
The funds' intention to play active roles in corporate governance is
also indicated by the fact that the funds have frequently chosen to
directly appoint their members to positions on companies' manage-
ment boards, which typically meet more frequently and are more
deeply involved in the details of the companies' operations than their
supervisory boards.8"
It may also be significant to note, however, that while nine of the
thirteen largest Czech and Slovak investment fund groups were
76 Boycko, supra note 20, at 8.
77 Decree on the 1994 Program of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the
Russian Federation § 9.5 (Russ. 1993).
78 Anderson, supra note 29, at 10.
79 Anderson, supra note 29, at 10.
80 Anderson, supra note 29, at 15-16.
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formed by banks,81 investment funds have not yet appeared to play a
significant role in arranging access to capital for the companies in
which they hold shares.8 One theory which may explain this reluc-
tance is that regulations prohibiting a fund from owning more than
twenty percent of the shares of any company discourage a fund from
undertaking costly activities such as the arranging of financing since
the fund will receive only a limited percentage of the benefits from
such efforts.8 3
A thirty-three percent ownership limit was set in the Polish legis-
lation on the theory that such a percentage should prevent an invest-
ment fund from passing resolutions without the agreement of at least
one other shareholder but was high enough to allow and motivate the
investment fund to appoint representatives to the corporate bodies of
the company and play an active role in monitoring and supervising the
company.
In Lithuania, most investment companies have sought to secure
their investments by purchasing the maximum of fifty percent of
shares in a company and strongly exercising their rights as sharehold-
ers.84 Even when in a position of control, however, the investment
funds usually do not directly manage the companies in which they in-
vest because they do not have enough personnel.8 5 In most cases they
limit their direct involvement to electing the members of the supervi-
sory board who then appoint and supervise the executive officers of
the company.86 The investment funds apparently have been active in
supervising and replacing company managers.8 7
Though the assets of the Lithuanian investment funds are usually
not liquid enough to allow them to directly provide capital to assist
companies in restructuring, some investment funds have been suffi-
ciently motivated by their large shareholdings to actively large foreign
and domestic investors to provide funds for company restructuring. 88
The activities of the Lithuanian investment funds as large sharehold-
ers has apparently raised some concerns: the Lithuanian Securities
Commission is reported to be currently drafting a new law on invest-
81 Mladek, supra note 5, at 22.
82 Anderson, supra note 29, at 10.
83 Anderson, supra note 29, at 10-11.
84 Algirdas Semetas, Post Privatization Secondary Markets in Lithuania 14 (Draft) (prepared
for the OECD Group on Privatization, Fifth Plenary Session, "Mass Privatization: A First As-
sessment of the Results," Paris, Mar. 2-4, 1994).
85 Id. at 12-15.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 14.
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ment funds which is designed to ensure greater risk diversification by
the investment funds and strengthen the monitoring and control of
investment fund managers.8 9
It is difficult to determine the exact limit to impose on an invest-
ment fund's ownership of shares in companies being privatized. The
need for strong corporate governance by investment funds will be
largely determined by the natural interests, motivation and power
which the management of privatizing companies will have in taking
the necessary steps to efficiently restructure their companies. Where
the management itself has a significant ownership interest in the com-
pany, it may be appropriately motivated to undertake such actions.
Where other employees, however, own a large portion of shares in the
company, it may be extremely difficult for management to take neces-
sary restructuring actions affecting employment without the aid of
large outside investors such as investment funds.
Another factor which must be considered in setting ownership
limits is whether investment funds in former communist economies
will be managed by individuals and management companies who have
sufficient experience and training to provide effective corporate gov-
ernance to restructuring companies. If the investment fund managers
do not have sufficient professional capabilities, it may be wise to limit
their ability to interfere with company management.
3. Limitation on Relations Between Investment Funds
Investment funds are often limited to owning no more than a
small percentage of the shares in another investment fund to avoid
situations where related investment funds may cooperate in anti-com-
petitive actions or in actions harmful to the interests of the other
shareholders in the controlled fund.90 For similar reasons it may also
be advisable to prevent affiliated management companies from man-
aging more than one investment fund. In the Czech and Slovak Re-
publics, for example, one management company and its affiliates
manage seventeen different funds.91
E. General Framework Issues
The final goal in drafting investment fund legislation is to ensure
that the legislation addresses the general issues necessary to govern
the basic establishment and operation of the funds and identifies the
89 Id. at 15.
90 See Regulations on Investment Funds, supra note 44, § 26.
91 Mladek, supra note 5, at 22.
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future regulations which must be developed by the government con-
cerning specific tax, accounting and valuation issues arising in connec-
tion with the operation of investment funds. Among such general
framework issues which investment fund regulations typically address
are the following:
1. Definition of Investment Funds
One of the most important provisions of an investment fund law
is one which defines the scope of the law and the type of enterprises
which it will govern. An excessively broad definition of investment
funds may overly restrict general investment activities and overburden
the government bodies responsible for licensing and monitoring in-
vestment funds. An overly narrow definition may allow enterprises to
engage in substantially the same activities in which investment funds
engage and present the same dangers, yet be technically exempt from
the restrictions of investment fund regulations 2
An acceptable compromise between these two concerns may be
to define an investment fund as any enterprise which issues its own
shares in return for vouchers or which has invested more than a cer-
tain percentage of its assets in the securities of other issuers. This is
the basic form of the definitions set forth in the Russian legislation.93
It may also be advisable, however, to add a subjective factor to the
definition of an investment fund, as is done in the United States, by
including any company which is primarily engaged or intends to be
engaged in the business of investing in securities.94 This type of clause
may prevent investment funds from avoiding the requirements of the
investment fund legislation during periods in which the percentage of
their assets invested in securities is below the objectively defined level,
such as during the formation of the fund.
Though banks, insurance companies and certain other types of
financial institutions may often fall within the technical definition of
an investment fund by investing a significant percentage of their assets
in securities, they are usually specifically exempted from the definition
because their investment activities are governed by the requirements
92 See Russian Government Prepares Anti-Fraud Package, TASS, Aug. 15, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library (investment fund claims to be exempt from regulations by offering "share
certificates" instead of shares).
93 Regulations on Investment Funds, supra note 44, § 2.
94 See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 3(a)(1) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
1 to 80a-52 (1981 & Supp. 1994)).
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of banking and insurance laws specifically tailored to their special po-
sitions in the economy.95
If a relatively low percentage of securities ownership may qualify
an enterprise as an investment fund, it may be appropriate when cal-
culating such percentages not to consider securities which an enter-
prise owns in its majority-owned subsidiaries.96 Otherwise, enter-
prises may be unable to effectively diversify their activities through
the establishment of subsidiaries or to establish holding companies to
manage their various subsidiaries without being subject to the inap-
propriate restrictions of the investment fund law.
2. Details of Fund Formation and Governance
The powers and duties of corporate bodies of investment funds
and the detailed procedures for their formation, liquidation and issu-
ance of shares are often set forth in the investment fund regulations in
ways which may slightly differ from the standard provisions governing
all joint stock companies. Such special powers, duties, and procedures
are designed to accommodate the specific operations of investment
funds, increase governmental oversight of the formation process and
ensure that many of the optional shareholder protections of the legis-
lation governing joint stock companies will be mandatorily applied in
the case of investment funds.
3. Taxation
The taxation of investment funds in a manner similar to other
joint stock companies presents a problem of double taxation: both the
operating company generating the original profit and the investment
fund are taxed before that profit reaches investment fund sharehold-
ers in the form of dividends. In such situations, shareholders may re-
ceive considerably less benefit by investing in investment funds than
by investing directly in operating companies. To address this problem,
investment funds and holding companies meeting certain standards
are usually exempted from taxation on the profits which they receive
from the companies in which they invest.
4. Requirement of Further Regulations
The investment fund legislation initially adopted in most coun-
tries sets out provisions governing the broad activities of investment
95 See, eg., Regulations on Investment Funds, supra note 44, § 3.
96 See Investment Company Act of 1940, supra note 94, § 3(a)(1).
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funds, not the detailed regulations which will eventually be required
to govern many of the technical and financial issues arising in connec-
tion with fund operations. In anticipation of these requirements, ini-
tial investment fund legislation frequently assigns government bodies
to begin to develop detailed regulations to govern such issues as: li-
censing requirements for investment fund founders, managers, deposi-
taries and share offerings; methods to be used in valuing investment
fund assets; specific accounting rules to apply to investment fund op-
erations; and specific tax regulations to apply to the operations and
profits of investment funds.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, the various legislative options discussed above will
prove ineffective unless they are supported by a government willing
and able to provide reliable enforcement of commercial laws. Priva-
tization and corporate laws must be enforced to prevent company
management from frustrating the efforts of investment funds to reor-
ganize the operations of privatized companies and replace ineffective
company managers. Ministries must have sufficient resources to mon-
itor fund activity and sufficient authority to sanction and remove fund
managers which violate the law. Licensing requirements must be dili-
gently and uniformly applied to maintain public confidence and pre-
vent unqualified persons from soliciting the vouchers and cash of
other citizens. In privatizing economies where budgetary resources
are in short supply and the regulation of private enterprise is a new
phenomenon, the necessary translation of the theory underlying in-
vestment fund legislation into practice presents the most difficult chal-
lenge of all.
